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APPROVAL
ABSTRACT: This article examines the systematic differences in earnings management 
including the possible impact of cross-country differences in culture on earnings 
management in seven countries: India, Hong Kong (China), Japan, France, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. A set of traditional financial variables (firm 
performance, business cycles) and cultural variables (Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Individualism, Power Distance) were used to test the hypotheses developed in this paper. 
Regression results indicate both the traditional financial variables and cultural variables 
can explain the choices of accounting accruals in different countries when the Jones 
Model serves as a dependent variable. Also, the Jones Model provides the most statistical 
explanatory power in the regression model on the international level. This paper's 
primary contribution to the existing literature is the thorough analysis of discretionary 
accruals and their relationship to traditional financial variables and cultural variables 
using a large data set.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
After a series of accounting scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and others, the 
former chairman of the Security and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, stated that if 
earnings management problems are not addressed soon, they will have adverse 
consequences for America’s financial reporting system. Furthermore, they will further 
damage America’s financial system as well as investor’s confidence in the stock market. 
Since that time, the research topic of earnings management has increased in popularity.
Much of the prior literature has attempted to define and explain earnings 
managemenLand several explanations of earnings management have been introduced in 
the literature. Bamea (1976) defines earnings management behavior as an attempt to 
reduce the cost of capital through a lowering of the assessment of firm risk, which in turn 
benefits shareholders by allowing management to convey information useful for predicting 
future earnings. Healy and Whalen’s (1999) definition is the most widely used in scholarly 
literature and concludes that earnings management is the use of judgment in financial 
reporting to mislead stakeholders about firm performance or to influence contractual 
outcomes. A more recent explanation has been raised by Buckmaster (2001), stating that 
earnings management was undertaken to ensure the distribution of dividends in years of 
poor performance.
Much of the literature on this topic has attempted to evaluate earnings management 
by studying firms’ financial statements. Over the years, several discretionary accrual 
models have been developed to quantify earnings management by evaluating their 
financial statement accounts. The discretionary accrual models include the DeAngelo
(1986) model, the Healy (1985) model, the Jones (1991) model, the Modified Jones (1995) 
model, and the Industry model (1998). Dechow et al. (1995) compared and evaluated the 
relative performance of the five models and concluded that the Modified Jones model 
provides the most powerful test of earnings management. However, their study is done 
solely in the United States and their research findings might not be appropriate for other 
countries. In this paper, we examine the four models (Jones, Modified Jones, Healy, and 
DeAngelo) and evaluate which model has the most statistical power on an international 
level.
Besides quantifying earnings management, the relevant literature also focuses on 
the study of varieties of incentives for earnings management such as earnings management 
on issuance of an initial public offering (Wong & Rao, 1998), seasoned equity offerings 
(Range, 1998), and mergers and acquisitions (Goodwin, 2009).
Among the published earnings management literature, there are a few recent 
studies that take into account the possible effects of cultural values on earnings 
management in an international context, identifying whether earnings management exists 
and if there is an incentive to manipulate earnings. Gary (1988) was the first to suggest 
that accounting values are derived from cultural values, while Bao and Bao (2004) 
suggest a relationship between culture and earnings management. However, neither 
explain how culture might be the significant factor contributing to earnings management. 
Also, they did not provide empirical results in their examinations. Chung et al. (2002), 
Leuz et al. (2003), Guan et al. (2006), and Timothy (2008) have indicated that there are 
systematic differences in earnings management due to different cultural dimensions and 
other institutional factors.
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In this study, we focus on the analysis of how traditional financial variables and 
cultural variables influence earnings managements in seven countries: India, Hong Kong 
(China), Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. We use a 
large cohort of firms (1158 firms) over a twenty year period (1992 to 2011) to examine 
the determinants of accruals in the seven countries.
This study contributes to understanding international differences in earnings 
management. First, the result indicates that there is a significant relationship between 
culture and earnings management. Secondly, there are international differences on 
determinates of accruals. Thirdly, the Jones model was found to be the most powerful 
model to measure earnings management on the international level.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter Two will discuss prior literature 
related to earnings management. Chapter Three discusses variables and data employed in 
our empirical tests, as well as hypotheses development. In Chapter Four, we will discuss 
empirical results and explain some of our findings, with concluding remarks about 
earnings management offered in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This chapter briefly reviews literature on the topic of earnings management. The 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 reviews definitions and methods of earnings 
management and related literature. Section 2.2 discusses different discretionary accrual 
models. Section 2.3 summarizes research findings on prior earnings management 
literature.
2.1 Definitions and Methods of Earnings Management
2.1.1 Definitions o f Earnings Management
In addition to the definition of earnings managements discussed in Chapter One, 
earnings management can further be classified into two types: earnings discretion and 
earnings smoothing. Earnings discretion is defined as when managers use discretion in 
accruals accounting to report earnings to achieve a certain target, or to avoid reporting 
small losses. This aspect of earnings management is generally associated with 
income-increasing accruals (Timothy, 2008). The other type of earnings management is 
earnings smoothing, which is defined as the process of manipulating the time profile of 
earnings (Dechow and Skinner, 2000) to make the reported income stream less of a 
variable (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).
In contrast to Arthur Levitt’s (1998) opinion on earnings management that was 
discussed in the previous chapter, Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that not all 
earnings management is problematic or requires immediate remedial action. They suggest
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that the existence of earnings management may not be a concern for investors. 
Furthermore, they make distinctions between fraud and earnings management, as shown 
in Figure 1.
Figure 1:
The Distinction Between Fraud and Earnings Management
Accounting Choices Real Cash Flow Choices
Conservative
Accounting
WITHIN GAAP
Overly aggressive recognition of 
provisions or reserves
Overvaluation of acquired in-process 
R&D in purchase acquisitions
Overstatement of restructuring 
charges and asset write-offs
Delaying sales
Accelerating R&D or advertising 
expenditures
Neutral
Earnings
Earnings that result from a neutral 
operation of the process
Aggressive
Accounting
Understatement of the provision for 
bad debts
Drawing down provisions or reserves 
in an overly-aggressive manner
Postponing R&D or advertising 
expenditures
Accelerating sales
Fraudulent
Accounting
VIOLATES GAAP
Recording sales before they are 
"realizable"
Recording fictitious sales
Backdating sales invoices
Overstating inventory by recording 
fictitious inventory
The table shows how different types of managerial choices are characterized, as well as 
the distinction between fraudulent choice and those that are accepted by generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP).
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2.1.2 Methods o f Earnings Management
Levitt (1998) concluded that there are five popular methods of earnings 
management: (a) “Big bath” is an earnings management technique that expenses the
restructuring cost of the income statement in order to reduce income in the current year. 
No amortization expenses are claimed on the restructuring expense, with the objective to 
achieve higher income in future years. The goal is to show a big loss in a single year so 
future years will show increased net income. Since the Wall Street analysts focus only on 
future earnings, they do not view restructuring as a negative signal for the stock price, 
(b) Creative acquisition accounting is when companies use stock as an acquisition 
currency. They record the acquisition price of another company as “in-process” research 
and development cost, and the entire amount can be expensed at once according to 
GAAP rules. In addition, the parent company tries to hide the future operating expenses 
from the acquired company by recording these expenses as a liability, avoiding negative 
effects on the parent company’s future earnings, (c) “Cookie jar reserves” arise when 
companies use unrealistic assumptions to estimate liabilities for such items as sales 
returns, loan losses, or warranty costs. These companies increase their accrual estimations 
to reduce earnings during good times and dramatically reduce their accrual estimations to 
increase earnings during bad times, (d) “Materiality” -  according to. auditing standards, 
materiality is a matter of professional judgment. The auditor’s primary responsibility is to 
ensure the financial statements are free of material misstatements. Companies misuse the 
concept of materiality by intentionally recording errors within a defined percentage 
ceiling and try to argue with auditors that the effect on the bottom line is too small to
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matter. Therefore, statements are free of material misstatements, (e) “Premature 
recognition of revenue” arises when companies try to boost earnings by manipulating the 
recognition of revenue. Companies often recognize revenue before products are shipped 
to customers.
2.2 Discretionary Accrual Models
In the following section, we will discuss the four most widely used models when 
measuring non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Managers use accrual based 
earnings management techniques to provide flexibility within accounting rules to manage 
firm earnings. One of the simplest methods to manage firm earnings is through early 
recognition of revenue. This method affects several financial statement accounts 
including revenue, accounts receivable and total assets. The models discussed below try 
to detect earning management by measuring percentage changes between financial 
statement accounts.
(A) The Healy Model (1985)
One of the earliest discretionary accrual models was developed by Healy in 1985. 
The model uses mean of total accruals Q]t TAt) scaled by lagged total assets (T) from the 
estimation period as the measure of non-discretionary accruals. The Healy model 
assumes that non-discretionary accruals follow a mean reverting process. This implies the 
following model for non-discretionary accruals:
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Where:
NDA = estimated non-discretionary accrual;
TA = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets;
t =1, 2...T is a year subscript for year included in the estimation period; and
t = a year of subscript indicating a year in the event period
Unlike other accrual models, the Healy model predicts that systematic earnings 
management occurs in every period. Thus, in order to estimate mean total accruals, Healy 
divided the sample into three groups, with earnings predicted to be managed upward into 
one group and downward into the other two groups. This approach is equivalent to 
treating the group that is predicted to be managed upwards as the estimation period and 
the other two groups as the event period. The mean total accruals from the estimation 
period then represent the measure of non-discretionary accruals.
(B) The DeAngelo Model (1986)
The underlying assumption of the DeAngelo model is that non-discretionary 
accruals follow a random walk process. The DeAngelo (1986) model uses the previous 
year’s total accruals (TAt-i) scaled by lagged total assets (At-2) as the measure of 
non-discretionary accruals. The DeAngelo model can be viewed as a special case of the 
Healy model in which the estimation period for non-discretionary accruals is restricted to 
the prior year’s observations. Dechow (1995) suggests that the DeAngelo model is more 
appropriate to be used when discretionary accruals follow a random walk, while the 
Healy model is appropriate to be used when discretionary accruals follow a white noise 
process around a constant mean. The empirical results suggest that the total accruals 
follow an approximate white noise process (Dechow, 1994).
(2.2)
Where:
NDAt = non-discretionary accrual at time t;
TAt-i = Total accrual at time t -  1;
At-2 = Total Asset at Time t-2.
(C) The Jones Model (1991)
Jones (1991) proposes a model that attempts to control for the effects of changes in 
a firm’s economic circumstances on non-discretionary accruals. He indicates that changes 
in total assets, gross revenue, and gross property plant and equipment are the determinants 
of non-discretionary accruals. This model assumes revenue is discretionary while changes 
in revenue are the reflection of a change in business conditions and business cycles. Unlike 
the previous models discussed, the Jones model assumes that the non-discretionary 
accruals are non-constant over time. The Jones model for non-discretionary accruals in 
the event year is:
NDAt = di (1/At -l) + 02 (AREVt /A t-i) + (X3 (PPEt /  At-i) (2.3)
Where
AREVt = revenue in year t less revenue in year t - 1 scaled by total asset at t -1:
PPEt = gross property plant and equipment in year t scaled by total asset at t -1:
At-i = total assets at t-1; and
at, 0 2 , 03 = firm-specific parameters.
Estimates of the firm-specific parameters, ax, a2 and a3 are generated using the 
following model in the estimation period:
TAt = ai ( 1/An) + 32 (AREVt) + as (PPEt) + Vt (2.4)
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Where: ai, ai, a* denote the OLS estimates of ai, a2, a? and TA is total accruals scaled by 
lagged total assets. Vt is the error term.
(D) The Modified Jones Model (1995)
The Modified Jones model is the modification of the aforementioned Jones model. 
The original Jones model was not designed to eliminate management manipulation on 
revenue through misstatement of accounts receivable. To calculate discretionary accruals, 
the modified Jones model removes discretionary accruals through adjustments in accounts 
receivable (AREVt - ARECt).
NDAt= (Xi (1/At-0 + 02((AREVt-ARECt)/At-O + Cb(PPEt/At-i) (2.5)
Where
AREVt = revenue in year t less revenue in year t -1  scaled by total asset at t -1;
ARECt = receivable in year t less receivable in year t-1 scaled by total asset at t-1;
PPEt = gross property plant and equipment in year t scaled by total asset at t -1;
At-i = total assets at t-1; and 
ai, 0 2 , 03 = firm-specific parameters.
(E) Total Accruals
Prior research by Healy (1985), and Jones (1991) introduced the following balance 
sheet approach equation to compute the total accruals:
TA = (ACAt-ACLt- ACasht -ASTDt -Dept)/At-i (2.6)
Where:
ACA = change in current assets
ACL = change in current liabilities
ACash = change in cash and cash equivalents
ASTD = change in debt included in current liabilities
Dep = depreciation and amortization expense
A = total assets
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The non-discretionary component reflects business conditions such as growth and 
the length of the operating cycles that naturally create and destroy accruals, while the 
amount from total accruals is a metric that reflects accruals that are due to management’s 
choice alone. In other words, there appears to be no business reason for these accruals, so 
discretionary accruals are a better proxy for earnings quality. Discretionary accruals is 
calculated by the following formula:
DAit = TAu -  NDAit (2.7)
The accrual models discussed above rely on a number of firm-specific variables in 
attempting to estimate the discretionary and non-discretionary portions of accounting 
accruals. Figure 2 presents a summary of discretionary accrual proxies used in the above 
models that were discussed. Dechow et al. (1995) compared the four accrual models and 
evaluated the specifications and power of commonly used test statistics in order to 
determine which model is most representative for the purpose of detecting earnings 
management. They concluded that the Modified Jones model provides the most powerful 
test to detecting earnings management. However, results of the four models are fairly 
similar. Therefore, we use the four models discussed above in our empirical testing to 
examine which model works best on the international level, combining data (presented in 
Chapter Four) from seven countries. In this study, we use the four models to calculate 
four different discretionary accruals and use the calculation results to serve as dependent 
variables for our estimations.
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Figure 2: Discretionary Accrual Proxies
Authors Discretionary Accrual Proxy
Healy (1985)
DeAngelo (1996)
Jones (1991)
Modified Jones Models
Total accrual
Change in total accruals
Residual from regression of total accruals 
on change in sales and property, plant and 
equipment
Residual from regression of total accruals 
on change in sales and property, plant and 
equipment, where revenue is adjusted from 
change in receivables in the event period
Source: McNichols (2000), P.317.
2.3 Prior research on earnings management
There is a wide range of earnings management research done on various topics in 
earnings management such as “earnings management and stock prices” and “earnings 
management and initial public offerings”. This paper will mainly focused on literature 
related to cultural influences on earnings management.
Gary’s (1988) study was the first to introduce the theory of cultural influence on the 
development of accounting systems. Figure 2 has summarized Gary’s model (1998). In his 
study, Gary argues that a country’s accounting systems are influenced by cultural 
dimensions which were developed by Hofstede (1980). His study suggests that 
institutional consequences and accounting values are generated from the cultural 
dimensions and a country’s accounting systems are a product of institutional consequences 
of accounting values.
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Figure 3
Gary’s Model of the Influence of Culture on Accounting
Accounting values
•  Professionalism
•  Uniformity
•  Conservatism
•  Secrecy
Cultural Dimensions
• Individualism
• Power distance
•  Uncertainty avoidance
•  Masculinity
•  Long-term orientation
Institutional consequences
•  Legal system
• Corporate ow nership
• Capital M arkets
•  Professional associations
• Education
• Religion
Accounting system
•  Authority
• Enforcement
•  M easurem ent
•  Disclosure
Source: Gary (1998).
Following Gary’s research, Leuz et al. (2003) studied systematic differences in 
earnings management across thirty one different countries. They investigated the 
relationship between investor protection and earnings management. They developed the 
hypothesis that managers have an incentive to manipulate the firm’s true performance in 
order to conceal the private control benefit and minimize interference from outsiders. The 
results of their study suggest that there is a negative relationship between investor 
protection and earnings management. The greater the protection provided for outside 
shareholders and the stronger the enforcement of legal rights, the lower the amount of 
earnings management in the country.
Guan et al. (2006) studied the possible impact of cross-country differences in 
culture on earnings management in five Asia-Pacific countries. They investigated the 
relationship between income-increasing accruals and the cultural value of individualism,
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power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and longer term orientations. The result of their 
study suggests the following:
a) There is a significant positive relationship between income- increasing discretionary 
accruals and Hofstede’s cultural values of individualism.
b) There is a significant negative relationship between income -increasing discretionary 
accruals and uncertainty avoidance.
c) There is a significant negative relationship between income -  increasing discretionary 
accruals and long-term orientations.
Recently, Timothy (2008) published a paper relating to culture and earnings 
managements in which he studied the effects of culture on earnings management across 
thirty one different countries. Timothy discussed the possible relationship between each of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, earnings smoothing and earnings discretion. According to 
Hofstede (1984), the societies which have high levels of uncertainty avoidance would 
prefer to be in control of their futures. Earnings smoothing is one of the methods used to 
manage the future. In addition, higher levels of uncertainty avoidance leads to greater 
usage of earnings discretion to avoid the uncertainty associated with potentially negative 
events (such as missing analysts’ earnings forecast). In societies that have high levels of 
collectivism (low levels of individualism), employees would expect the firm to defend 
their interests, namely stability and long term sustainability. Firms in these societies are 
more likely to smooth their earnings. The results of his studies suggest that cultural 
dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and individualism are significantly related to earnings 
management.
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CHAPTER THREE 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
The following chapter discusses data selection and research design used to estimate 
the empirical results of this study. Chapter Three is divided into three sections: Section 3.1 
discusses the samples used in this study, Section 3.2 discusses the variables and hypotheses 
development, and Section 3.3 discusses the methodology used in this study.
3.1 Data Selection
The -data is collected from the CaptiallQ database. The analysis is based on 
financial data from 1992 to 2011 for over 1,158 firms from seven countries. For the 
purpose of the study, data was collected for all firms in the following seven countries: India, 
Hong Kong (China), Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. In 
order to be included in the sample, a country must have at least 900 firm-year observations 
for a number of accounting variables, including total assets, total liabilities, sales, and 
accounts receivable. Each firm that had income statement and balance sheet information 
for at least two consecutive years was included in our data. Table 1 shows the detailed 
breakdown of the number of firms that were included in the sample. The final sample 
consists of 1,158 firms and 23,160 firm-year observations between 1992 and 2011.
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Table 3.1
Description o f sample selected by country
Country Number of firms Period covered
Total
observations
India 126 1992 -  2011 2.520
Hong Kong 58 1992-2011 1.160
Japan 243 1992-2011 4.860
United Kingdom 299 1992-2011 5.980
France 49 1992-2011 980
Canada 94 1992 -  2011 1.880
United States 289 1992 -  2011 5.780
Total 1,158 23.160
3.2 Variable Description and Hypotheses Development
3.2.1 Financial Variables
(a) D/E ratio (DE)
Many earnings management articles found significant results that managers have 
more incentive to perform income increasing earning management when the firm's debt to 
equity ratio is high and close to the debt covenant violations. As an example, Duke and 
Hunt (1990) suggested that when the debt covenants restrictions are related to retained 
earnings, working capital, and net tangible assets, managers are more likely to manipulate 
the debt to equity ratio to meet the debt covenant restrictions. Thus, as the debt to equity 
ratio increases, income-increasing activity is expected; that is, a positive association is 
predicted.
Although we have mentioned that managing debt to equity ratio may be used to 
prevent violation of debt covenants, the results of that research were based on US firms. 
There is no compelling reason to believe that the closeness to debt covenants will influence 
the managers in other countries to choose to increase accrual. As an example, the different
16
sources of debt could be the reason for the different effects of debt covenants on earnings 
management. Most Japanese corporations borrow money from banks, while most large 
Hong Kong firms borrow from insurance companies and various types of bonds. Therefore, 
the higher debt to equity ratio does not necessarily mean that the firm is close to debt 
covenant violations. Thus, the hypothesis that the higher the debt to equity ratio would 
result in higher earnings management might not be true for all the countries used in this 
study.
H I :  THERE IS A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEBT TO EQUITY RATIO AND 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
(b) Firm Size (FS)
Warfield et al. (1995) and Beasley et al. (2000) suggested that corporate 
governance mitigates the degree of earnings management and improves the quality of 
financial reporting. Also, Kim and Liu (2003) suggested that the larger the firm size, the 
less earnings management may be feasible. The large firm has more sophisticated internal 
control systems that ensure the reliability of financial information disclosed to the public. 
Therefore, large firms are more likely to design and maintain more effective internal 
control systems in comparison to small firms which would reduce the ability of 
management to manipulate the firm’s earnings. Furthermore, the large firms are usually 
audited by the big four auditors. The big four accounting firms have more experienced and 
knowledgeable staff to perform the audit. As a result, the firms audit by the big four 
auditors’ report lower level of discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998; Frances et al.,
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1999; and Payne and Robb, 2000). Also, Lennox (1999) found that the audit reports 
issued by a big four auditor are more informative, exhibiting that the auditor size is 
positively related to the audit quality.
H 2 : F ir m  s iz e  is  n e g a t iv e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  e a r n in g s  m a n a g e m e n t
(c) Firm Performance (FP)
Bartov et al. (2000) compiled evidence stating that firms may meet or beat their 
earning expectation through earnings management. Myer and Skinner (2000) purport that 
the firms that had preceding positive earnings are more likely to manipulate earnings to 
keep a consecutive earnings growth trend; therefore, the performance of the firm in the 
prior year influences the manager’s tendency to manipulate earnings to meet or exceed the 
analyst’s earnings forecast. For the purpose of this study, we use return on asset instead of 
stock prices as a measure of firm performance. The underlining assumption is that the 
return on asset captures the percentage changes in the financial statement; however, stock 
prices do not provide an indication of any changes in the financial statement nor how that 
would affect firm’s operating performance.
H 3 : P r o f it a b il it y  is  p o s it iv e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  e a r n in g s  m a n a g e m e n t
(d) Business Cycles (BC)
The behavior of earnings management may also be affected by economic cycles. 
During the expansion period, there are more opportunities for firms to do
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income-decreasing accruals. During the contraction period, firms are more likely to do the 
opposite. In the earnings management literature, the methods used for earnings 
management are either accounting method or estimation of accruals. For the purpose of 
this study, we will test earnings management by examining the magnitude of estimated 
discretionary accruals. The reason for choosing this method is that current accruals are the 
primary tool for management to do earnings management. Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
found that the quality of accruals and earnings is negatively related to economic cycle. 
Therefore, we include business cycle as a control variable in our model to examine whether 
the business cycle affects the firm’s propensity for earnings management. The National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) provides a chronology of the US business cycle. 
The US business cycle periods were applied to all countries. The underlining assumption is 
that the US economy has significant influences over the other 6 countries. Based on the 
data from 1992 to 2011 we determine the expansion and contraction period as following: 
Contracting periods- 1981, 1982, 1990, 1991, 2001, 2007-2000, and 2011; Expansion 
periods- 1983-1989,1992-2000, 2002-2006, and 2010.
H 4 : T h e  d is c r e t io n a r y  a c c r u a l  is  l o w e r  d u r in g  t h e  e x p a n s io n  p e r io d , a n d
HIGHER DURING THE CONTRACTION PERIOD.
(e) Tax Rate (TR)
Tax rates may also be a factor for causing earnings management activities. The 
higher the tax rate a country has, the more incentive for management to use
19
income-decreasing accruals to minimize tax expenses. This argument will be tested in the 
following hypothesis:
H5: T a x  r a t e s  a r e  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t
Cultural Dimensions
The significance of culture in influencing and explaining behavior in social systems 
has been recognized and explored in a wide range of literature. Hofstede’s (1980, 1983) 
research studied the structural elements of culture and particularly those which most 
strongly affect known behaviors in work situations in organizations. Hofstede obtained 
data from a survey of 117,000 employees of large corporations in sixty seven countries. 
The research project used the survey answers on thirty two value statements to calculate 
each country’s score on cultural dimensions. The higher score in each dimension indicates 
their ranking among the countries. For the purpose of this study, seven countries were 
selected from Hofstede’s (1984) summary and are shown in Table 2.
(f) Uncertainty Avoidances (UA)
According to Hofstede (1984), Uncertainty Avoidances is the degree to which the 
members of a society feel comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. Companies in the 
countries with a high value of uncertainty avoidance score would try to control the future 
by managing its earnings. Income increasing earnings management can occur as a result of 
the desire to avoid the negative impact likely to arise from fears of not meeting the analysts’ 
earnings forecast, and the violation of debt covenants, etc. As a result, the higher level of
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uncertainty avoidance should lead to greater usage of earnings management to avoid the 
uncertainty associated with these potential negative events.
H6: U n c e r t a i n t y  A v o id a n c e  is  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t .
(g) Individualism (IND)
Arguably, senior management benefits most from the companies’ high growth rate 
and short term successes due to incentive programs like bonuses and stock options. 
Managers in countries with high levels of individualism have an incentive to report higher 
earnings to meet or exceed the analysts’ earnings forecast in order to satisfy their personal 
needs. On the other hand, managers in countries with low levels of individualism would be 
less inclined to use earnings management due to risk of long term harm that earnings 
management would bring to the company as well as the stockholders. Hofstede (1980) 
suggests that in countries with high collectivism, members of the firm would expect the 
organization to look after themselves like family members and to defend their best interest. 
Earnings management might be viewed as harmful to the society and company.
H7: I n d iv id u a l i s m  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t
(h) Power Distance (PD)
According to Hofstede (1984), power distance is the extent to which the members 
of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally. “In 
large power distance countries, accounting systems will be frequently used to justify the 
decisions of the top power holders: they are seen as the power holders’ tool to present the
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desired image and figures will be twisted to this end” (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, p. 
259). Hofstede suggested that there is a positive relationship between power distance and 
earnings management. This argument will be tested in the following hypothesis:
H8: T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  p o w e r  d i s t a n c e  a n d  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  is
POSITIVE
Table 3.2 summarized the expected relations between Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions and earnings management. Uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and power 
distance are expected to influence earnings management.
Table 3.2
EXPECTED RELATIONS BETWEEN CULTURAL DIMENSIONS AND EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT
Cultural Dimensions Earnings Management
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Positive
Individualism (IND) Positive
Power Distance (PD) Positive
In addition, the model includes several institution control variables that have been 
found in prior research to influence earning qualities internationally. We followed Leuz et 
al.’s (2003) findings and added two primary control variables to our models which: 
Outside Investor Rights and Legal Enforcement measures of investor protection. Outside 
Investor Rights is a proxy used by La Porta et al. (1998) as a measure of ‘Anti-director 
Rights’, and Legal Enforcement is computed as the average three variables developed by 
La Porta et al. The three variables are (a) efficiency of judicial system, (b) rule of law, and
(c) government corruption. The two additional controls are a measure of the strength of
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security regulations related to publicly listed companies (Burgstahler et al., 2006), and the 
nature of a country’s legal system. Security Regulation is measured as the average of three 
variables developed by La Porta et al. (2000): (1) a disclosure requirements index, (2) an 
index of the investor’s difficulty in recovering losses, and (3) an index of public 
enforcement of security regulations. Finally, legal system indicates: (i) Common Law 
system and (ii) Code Law system. Related research by Ball et al. (2000) finds the common 
law legal system provides more effective prevention to limit companies using dictionary 
accrual methods to manipulate their earnings.
Table 3.3 reports the seven countries’ score for the relevant cultural dimension and 
legal institution variables. For the purpose of this study, we assumed these cultural and 
institutional variables are constant overtime. Even though these cultural and institutional 
value changes over time especially when our study covers a twenty year period, our 
assumption is that the changes in these variable are very small and does not have 
significant consequences to our study results. Table 3.3 also indicates that Japan has the 
highest score (92) for Uncertainty Avoidance among the sampled countries and Hong 
Kong has the lowest score (29). The US has the highest score (91) in Individualism and 
Hong Kong has the lowest score (25). For Power Distance scores, India ranks number one 
and the UK has the lowest score. India, Hong Kong, the UK, Canada, and the US arc 
under the Common law system. La Porta et.al (1998) ranked Outside Investor Rights from 
one to five. If a particular country got a score of five, it means that the country has the 
highest investor protection. As Table 2 indicated, France has the lowest score in Outside 
Investor Protection amongst these sample countries. The higher score on legal enforcement 
indicates that laws in that country play an important role in economic activities and there is
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less government corruption. In our sample, Canada has the highest and India has the lowest 
score for legal enforcement. La Porta et al. (1998) also breaks down countries into two 
legal system groups: Common Law system and Code Law system, and they assigned a 
value of one to Common Law system and a value of zero to the Code Law system. This 
“anti-director rights index” has been used as a measure of shareholder protection in over a 
hundred articles since it was introduced by La Porta in 1998.
Table 3.3
Cultural Dimensions and Legal Institutions
Country
Cultural Dimensions Legal Institutions
UA IND PD OIR ENF REG LEG
India 40 48 77 5 5.58 0.75 0
Hong Kong 29 25' 68 5 8.91 0.82 0
Japan 92 46 54 4 9.17 0.47 1
United Kingdom 35 89 35 5 9.22 0.72 0
France 86 71 68 3 8.68 0.58 1
Canada 48 80 39 5 9.75 0.91 0
United States 46 91 40 5 9.54 0.97 0
Notes:
Cultural Dimensions (Source: Hofstede, 2001, p.SOO)
UA - Uncertainty Avoidance 
IND -  Individualism 
PD - Power Distance
The higher the number, the higher the country ranks on that particular dimension.
Legal institutions
OIR - Outside Investor Rights (source: LaPorta et al., 1998,pp. 1130-1; Antidirector Rights').
ENF - Legal Enforcement (source: LaPorta et al., 1998, pp.l 142-3; average of 'Efficiency of Judicial System’, 
‘Rule of Law' and Corruption Index')
REG - Securities Regulation (source: LaPorta et al., 2006, pp. 15-16; average of'Disclosure Requirements', 
Liability Standard' and Public Enforcement')
LEG - Legal System (source: LaPorta et al., 1998, pp. 1130-1; Common Law = English origin; Code Law =French 
origin, German origin, Sxandinavian origin); Common Law = 0; Code law = 1.
24
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Measuring the Discretionary Accruals
Most of the prior studies in earnings management focus on explaining accounting 
choices by examining the relationship between an accounting choice variable and a 
number of explanatory variables. Following Dechow et al. (1995), we measure the 
discretionary accruals by using the four models that were discussed in Chapter Two. The 
variables used in the calculation of accruals are listed in the empirical tests provided in 
Table 3.4.
3.3.2 Model Specification 
Discretionary
In order to examine the relationship between earnings management and a number 
of explanatory variables, the following models are designed to undertake a multiple 
regression analysis:
3.3.2.1 Model 1: Earnings Management and Traditional Financial Variables
Following many prior earnings management studies, Model 1 was designed to 
evaluate how the traditional financial variables explain earnings management in each of 
the seven countries.
Model 1 : DA =  a  + faDE  +  faFS  +  fa  FP + fa  TR + faBC  + ef (3.1)
Ei = Random error Term
fa  .... fa  = model parameters
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Table 3.4 Descriptions of Variables Used
Notations Names Descriptions
NDA Non-discretionary accruals Non-discretionary accrual value as 
determined by the four discretionary 
accrual models
DA Discretionary accruals Discretionary accrual value as 
determined by the four models. 
Discretionary accrual is equal to total 
accrual less non-discretionary accruals.
TA Total Asset Total assets of a firm in year t
AREV Change in revenue revenue in year t less revenue in year t -1
AREC Change in receivables receivables in year t less revenue in year 
t-1
PPE Property, Plant and 
Equipment
Property, plant and equipment in year t
BC Business Cycles Dummy Variables with value of zero 
during contraction period, one during the 
expansion period.
D/E Debt to Equity ratio Debt to equity ratio of the firm in year t
Dep Depreciation Depreciation expense of the firm in year t
ROA Return on Assets Earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total asset of the firm at year t
ACL Change in current liabilities Current liabilities in year t less current 
liabilities in year t-1
FS Firm Size Total assets of the firm in year t
FP Firm Performance Return on assets of the firm in year t.
TR Tax Rate Marginal tax rate for year t.
UA Uncertainty Avoidance Assigned value based on the ranking 
among countries
PD Power Distance Assigned value based on the ranking 
among countries
IND Individualism Assigned value based on the ranking 
among countries
OIR Outside Investor Rights Assigned value based on the ranking 
among countries
ENG Enforcement Assigned value based on the ranking 
among countries
REG Regulations Assigned value based on the ranking 
among countries
LEG Legal system Dummy variables. Common law = 1 and 
Code law = 0.
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3.3.2.2 Model 2: Earnings Management and Cultural Variables
We developed the second model which only used the cultural variables to explain 
earnings management. We are interested to see how powerful the model would be when 
only cultural variables are included in the model.
Model 2: DA =  a + faUA +  faIND + fa  PD + et (3.2)
Ei = Random error Term
f a .... fa  = model parameters
3.3.3 Model 3: Earnings Management among Traditional Financial and Cultural 
Variables
Following Guna et al. (2006) and Timothy (2008), we included both the traditional 
financial variables and cultural variables into Model 3. We are motivated to see how well 
both variables can explain earnings management.
Model 3: DA =  a + faDE  +  faFS  "h fa  FP +  fa  TR + fS$ BC +  /?g UA +  fa  IND +  
faPD  + f a O + E t  (3.3)
£j = Random error Term
fa .... f a  = model parameters
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3.3.2.4 Model 4: Earnings Management among Traditional Financial, Cultural and 
Institutional Variables
In an effort to improve the methodology, the institutional variables were added to 
Model 4. We are interested to see if the institutional factors limited the ability of managers 
to perform earnings management.
Model 4: DA = a + pt DE +  p2FS +  /?3 FP + /?4 TR + /JSBC + p6 UA +  p7 IND +
/?6 PD + /?7 OIR +  /?g EN + /?9 REG+ Pxo LEG +  £,• (3.4)
£( = Random error Term
Pi — • Pio = model parameters
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C h a p t e r  f o u r
E m pir ic a l  R esu lts
This chapter discusses the empirical results of our statistical analyses of earnings 
managements for the period from 1992 to 2011. This chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 4.1 discusses the descriptive analysis of the variables used in the empirical testing, 
Section 4.2 provides a correlation analysis among the independent variables, Section 4.3 
discusses the descriptive cluster analysis of the seven countries, Section 4.4 discusses our 
regression results from seven individual countries and discretionary accruals from the 
four models are served as dependent variables and traditional financial variables are 
served as independent variables, and Section 4.5 discusses a multivariate analysis based 
on seven countries and the cultural and institutional variables used in this analysis.
4.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 4 provides the summary of descriptive statistics of key variables by country. 
The table reveals that French firms have the largest average size of firms in our sample 
(approximately $114 million in total assets), and India has the smallest sample 
(approximately $343 thousand in total assets). There is, however, significant variation in 
size across the sample in each country as represented by the minimum and maximum 
values and standard deviations. Data on the debt to equity ratio reveals that Japanese firms 
have the highest average debt to equity ratio of 1.48 followed by French firm’s 0.96 and US 
firm’s 0.688. India has the lowest debt to equity ratio at 0.085. The other three countries 
have a similar average debt to equity ratio. This suggests that the capital structure of the
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Japanese companies is definitely different from that of the other six countries in this study. 
A high debt-equity ratio generally means that a company has been aggressive in financing 
its growth with debt. However, the downfall of debt financing is that firms have to meet 
certain bank covenants, such as the debt covenant that determines that debt to equity ratio 
cannot exceed 1.5 to 1. If the covenant is breached, the banks will call back the loan and 
the firms will be at risk of bankruptcy. Return on assets ratio data reveals that Canadian 
firms have the highest return on assets with 3.1% followed by French firm's 2.9%. Indian 
firms have the lowest return on assets ratio at only 0.9%. Return on assets is an indicator of 
how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. Therefore, ROA gives an idea as to 
how efficiently management uses the company’s assets to generate earnings. The table also 
reveals that the average tax rate for Japanese firms is 41%, which is the highest average tax 
rate among the sample of seven countries. The United Kingdom has the second highest tax 
rate of 31.4% and France is in third place with 24.6%. Indian firms have the lowest tax rate 
of 0.7%. This suggests that the tax system among the sample countries is significantly 
different in this study.
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables by Country
Country Variable N Mean Std. Dev Median Minimum Maximum
India
DA(Jones) 2539 -0.237 1.472 6.024 -26.213 38.261
DA(Modified Jones) 2539 -0.204 1.336 7.111 -22.951 37.173
DA(Healy) 2539 0.002 0.086 2.158 -0.016 4.332
DA(DeAngelo) 2539 0.017 1.013 23.830 -3.021 50.681
Asset 2539 343.0 2,686 30,812 0.001 61,623
DE 2539 0.085 0.450 3.644 0.002 7.289
EPS 2539 0.139 0.609 0.012 0.002 20.350
ROA 2539 0.009 0.038 0.163 0.004 0.326
TR 2539 0.070 0.177 2.696 0.000 5.392
Hong Kong
DA(Jones) 1180 -0.039 0.120 -0.007 -1.173 1.520
DA(Modified Jones) 1180 0.056 0.185 0.660 -0.758 2.079
DA(Healy) 1180 0.000 0.003 0.032 -0.019 0.083
DA(DeAngelo) 1180 -0.033 0.122 0.194 -1.135 1.522
Asset 1180 83,770 298,242 4,667 0.001 2,555,579
DE 1180 0.314 0.823 0.064 0.001 14.297
EPS 1180 3.868 59.885 0.040 -5.740 1,129.120
ROA 1180 0.029 0.045 0.011 -0.076 0.275
TR 1180 0.116 0.147 0.090 0.000 2.321
Japan
DA(Jones) 4879 -0.148 0.186 -0.134 -6.226 2.207
DA(Modified Jones) 4879 -0.109 0.152 -0.109 -1.256 2.210
DA(Healy) 4879 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
DA(DeAngelo) 4879 -0.042 0.160 0.479 -1.256 2.214
Asset 4879 36,462 150,955 8,441 0.000 2,692,589
DE 4879 1.487 3.344 0.725 0.000 82.355
EPS 4879 5.056 69.261 1,360.800 -513.820 3,235.420
ROA 4879 0.017 0.029 0.159 -0.121 0.439
TR 4879 0.410 9.569 332.143 0.000 664.286
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Country Variables N Mean Std. Dev Median Minimum Maximum
United Kingdom
DA(Jones) 5999 0.083 0.706 0.009 -34.391 6.372
DA(Modified Jones) 5999 -0.099 0.723 0.009 -40.752 4.638
DA(Healy) 5999 -0.085 6.496 0.000 -503.125 0.106
DA(DeAngelo) 5999 0.000 1.007 0.000 -40.250 40.170
Asset 5999 1,424 5,572 150 0.000 134,981
DE 5999 0.508 2.657 37.580 0.000 75.161
EPS 5999 0.615 75.197 479.890 -2,616.350 3,576.130
ROA 5999 0.024 0.067 0.310 -0.589 1.209
TR 5999 0.314 13.214 511.152 0.000 1,022.303
France .
DA(Jones) 999 -0.045 0.184 -0.005 -2.391 0.689
DA(Modified Jones) 999 0.021 0.151 0.020 -1.760 0.873
DA(Healy) 999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DA(DeAngelo) 999 0.002 0.177 0.153 -1.552 1.858
Asset 999 114,336 306,089 21,703 0.000 2,613,879
DE 999 0.903 2.070 0.562 0.000 53.614
EPS 999 1.790 8.023 1.560 -108.160 58.710
ROA 999 0.031 0.033 0.027 -0.034 0.239
TR 999 0.246 0.223 0.267 0.000 3.562
Canada
DA(Jones) 1879 0.008 0.133 0.007 -1.257 1.272
DA(Modified Jones) 1879 0.006 0.133 -0.004 -1.280 1.272
DA(Healy) 1879 0.000 0.002 -0.015 -0.050 0.019
DA(DeAngelo) 1879 -0.050 0.136 -0.014 -1.947 0.708
Asset 1879 25,442 83,125 2,679 0.000 821,465
DE 1879 0.548 2.739 0.252 0.000 108.334
EPS 1879 3.592 73.350 0.580 0.000 2,996.240
ROA 1879 0.039 0.052 0.025 0.000 0.568
TR 1879 0.244 1.492 0.152 0.000 47.052
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Country Variable___________ N_____ Mean Std. Dev Median Minimum Maximum
United States
DA(Jones) 5999 0.073 0.295 -2.696 -11.479 6.086
DA(Modified Jones) 5999 0.073 0.295 -2.696 -11.479 6.086
DA(Healy) 5999 0.000 0.025 -0.856 -1.890 0.179
DA(DeAngelo) 5999 -0.036 0.309 -7.196 -15.634 1.242
Asset 5999 18,842 113,812 312.260 0.000 2,264,909
DE 5999 0.668 5.981 152.167 0.000 304
EPS 5999 11.47 249.71 3,572 -1,404 8,548
ROA 5999 0.028 0.068 -0.538 ' -1.552 0.477
TR 5999 0.160 0.570 13.808 0.000 27.615
Variables
DA= Discretionary Accruals
ASSET = Total assets (in millions o f US dollars)
DE = Book debt to book equity ratio 
EPS = Earnings per share in dollars
ROA = Return on Assets (net income divided by total assets)
TR = Effective tax rate (total tax expense divided by income before taxes)
33
4.2 Correlation Analysis among the Independent Variables
Table 4.2 presents the Spearman (non-parametric) correlation coefficients for the 
independent variables. Table 4.2 shows that Outside Investor Right is highly correlated 
with Uncertainty Avoidance and Individualism. Also, Regulation is highly correlated with 
Outside Investor Rights as well. The correlation between these variables is highly 
significant. However, none of remaining independent variables are highly correlated, 
neither positively or negatively. Although there are few independent variables are highly 
correlated with each other, the result from this table suggests that multicollinearity is not a 
concern.
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Table 4.2
SPEARMAN CORRELATION COFFICIENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DE FS FP BC EPS TR UA IND PD OIR ENF REG LEG
DE 1.000
FS 0.540** 1.000
FP 0.005 0.008 1.000
BC -0.029** -0.108** -0.009 1.000
EPS 0.114** 0.437** -0.046** -0.010 1.000
Tax rate 0.099** 0.057** -0.065** -0.007 -0.026** 1.000
UA 0.313** 0.394** 0.000 0.000 0.186** 0.059** 1.000
IND -0.176** -0.244** 0.000 0.000 0.071** -0.153** -0.277** 1.000
PD 0.089** -0.135** 0.000 0.000 0.012* 0.185** -0.400** -0.587** 1.000
OIR -0.350** -0.449** 0.000 0.000 -0.088** -0.065** -0.754** 0.607** -0.460** 1.000
ENF 0.011** 0.116** 0.000 0.000 0.21** -0.197** 0.239** 0.654** 0.380** 0.255** 1.000
REG -0.224** -0.173** 0.000 0.000 0.097** -0.208** -0.594** 0.718** -0.624** 0.687** 0.532** 1.000
LEG 0.356** 0.445** 0.000 0.000 0.067** 0.071** 0.768** -0.627** 0.452** -0.094** -0.256** -0.039** 1.000
**Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Notes:
DE • Debt to Equity Ratio
FS - Firm Size
FP - Financial Performance
EPS - Earnings Per share
TR - Tax Rate
BC - Business Cycle
UA - Uncertainty Avoidance
IND • Individualism
PD - Power Distance
OIR - Outside Investor Rights
ENF - Legal Enforcement
REG - Securities Regulations
LEG- Legal System
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4.3 Descriptive Cluster Analysis
Table 4.3 reports the result of the cluster analysis by using Hosftede’s cultural 
dimension indices. Panel A in this table lists the countries comprising of each cluster 
ranked from low to high according to their aggregate earnings management found in 
Timothy’s (2008) paper. Also, the seven countries are divided into three clusters by using 
Hosftede’s (1980) method. Hofstede identified nine distinct cultural areas based on the 
patterns of cultural dimension across countries1. According to Hofstede, Clusters 1 is 
comprised of countries that are described as the Anglo, Nordic and Germanic cultural areas; 
Cluster 2 consists of countries that are in the Asian-Colonial and less developed areas; and 
Cluster 3 consists of countries from a variety of cultural areas, including several more 
developed Latin countries.
Panel B in Table 4.3 reports the mean value of each cultural dimension by cluster. 
The P-values in this table are from a one-way ANOVA and they indicate that a significant 
difference exists across the clusters on each of the cultural dimensions. Post hoc 
comparisons indicate that each cluster differs significantly from the other clusters on each 
of the cultural dimensions. Cluster 1 has the highest average for Individualism and lowest 
average for Power Distance. Cluster 2 has the highest Power Distance and lowest 
Uncertainty Avoidance. Cluster 3 has the highest Uncertainty Avoidance and median 
scores from Individualism and Power Distance.
1 See Hofstede (1980, P.336) for the composition of each of the nine cultural areas.
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Table 4.3
RESULTS OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS USING HOFSTED'S CULTURAL DIMENSION INDICES
Panel A: Cluster Membership of Countries
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
United States Hong Kong France
Canada India Japan
United Kingdom
Panel B: Mean Values of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension Indices by Cluster
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 p-value
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) 43.0 34.5 89.0 .002 **
Individualism (IND) 86.7 36.5 58.5 .004 **
Power Distance (PD) 38.0 72.5 61.0 .006 **
Panel C: Earnings Management by Cluster
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 p-value
Healy Model 0.039 0.011 0.001 .004 **
DeAngelo Model 0.029 0.008 0.020 .006**
Jones Model 0.054 0.135 0.097 .001 **
Modified Jones Model 0.007 0.064 0.044 .001 **
Panel D; Test of difference In Earnings Management by Cluster
Cl vs. C2 C2 vs. C3 Cl vs. C3 p-value
Healy Model 0.028 0.010 0.038 .001 **
DeAngelo Model 0.021 -0.012 0.020 .003 **
Jones Model -0.081 0.038 0.097 .004 **
Modified Jones Model -0.057 0.020 0.044 .009 **
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Panel C in Table 4.3 reports the earnings management results from four different 
models of discretionary accruals in each cluster. The results do not provide a clear 
indication of which cluster resulted in a higher level of earnings management. However, 
the p-value indicates that there is a significant difference in earnings management between 
each model that was used to estimate discretionary accruals. One explanation for this 
deviation is the difference in accounting standards amongst each cluster.
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Panel D in Table 4.3 reports results based on the difference in means. The result 
suggests that significant differences exist in earrings management between each cluster. 
One possible explanation is that each cultural dimension might play an important role in 
earnings management. In the following section of this study, we will use a series of 
regression analyses to demonstrate the significance of the cultural variable in earnings 
management.
4.4 Regression Analysis
4.4.1 Regression Results based on Individual Countries
Table 4.4 reports the regression results by country. Four discretionary accruals 
serve as the dependent variables for the regression. As an example, column 3 reports the 
regression results that use discretionary accruals from the Healy model as the dependent 
variable.
4.4.1.1 Regression Results from the Three Asian Countries
Results from Table 4.4 panels A to C suggest that the relationship between firm 
performance (FP) and earnings management is negative among the Asian countries. This 
result suggests that we should reject hypothesis number 4. Consistent with our findings, 
Gong et al. (2008) documented a significant negative association between the abnormal 
accrual and both future operating performance and future stock performance post IPO. One 
explanation for this negative relationship is that Indian firms used the earnings 
management to report higher earnings and show investors the growth opportunity during
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the pre-IPO stage. Firms then reversed the income increasing accruals after the IPO and, 
therefore, the profitability of the firm significantly decreased post-IPO.
Results from Table 4.4 panels B and C show a significant relationship between debt 
to equity ratio (D/E) and earnings management in Hong Kong and Japan. As we discussed 
in Chapter Three, when a firm’s debt to equity ratio is high, firms would report higher 
earnings to avoid breach of bank covenants. Therefore, we accept hypothesis number 1.
Results from Table 4.4 panel C show a significant relationship between business 
cycles and earnings management. Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 4 that 
discretionary accruals are higher during the contraction period.
The adjusted R2 is relatively high for the Jones and Modified Jones models in 
India. The high adjusted R2 suggests that the percentage of variation in the dependent 
variables can be explained well by the independent variables. The F statistics suggest that 
most of the Jones and Modified Jones models in the three countries are significant. In other 
words, Jones and Modified Jones models better explain earnings management in the Asian 
countries.
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Table 4.4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL VARIABLES AND EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT BASED ON COUNTRIES
Panel A -  INDIA
Variable Healy DeAngelo Jones
Modified
Jones
Intercept 0.001 0.008 0.043 0.029
(0.890) (0.858) (0.370) (0.518)
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.01 -0.013 0.007 0.014
(0.945) (0.780) (0.171) (0.767)
Firm Size 8.2E-9 6.4E-7 7.2E-6 8.4E-6
(0.990) (0.937) (0.378) (0.286)
Firm Performance -0.005 0.003 -26.026 -22.226
(0.908) (0.996) (0.001) ** (0.001) **
Business Cycle 0.002 0.021 -0.060 -0.044
(0.634) (0.654) (0.246) (0.374)
Earnings Per Share -0.001 -0.025 0.049 0.038
(0.945) (0.468) (0.193) (0.281)
Tax rate -0.002 -0.035 -0.050 -0.128
(0.820) (0.773) (0.703) (0.304)
Adjusted R*2 0.001 0.002 0.447 0.397
F Statistics 
N = 1539
0.073 0.217 36.306 56.529
Notes:
**Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Top number is the coefficient, number below in brackets is the p-value
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Panel B - Hong Kong
Variable Healy DeAngelo Jones
Modified
Jones
Intercept 0.009 0.008 -0.012 -2.876
(0.350) (0.351) (0.462) (0.403)
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.001 0.011 0.015 0.511
(0.857) (0.016) * (0.089) * (0.789)
Firm Size -6.4E-9 -2.5E-8 8.3E-9 201E-6
(0.671) (0.114) (0.749) (0.698)
Firm Performance -0.303 -0.539 -0.079 -0.08
(1.4E-4) ** (1.3E-14) ** (0.558) (3.2E-4) **
Business Cycle -0.009 -0.024 -0.007 2.879
(0.354) (0.003) ** (0.664) (0.393)
Earnings Per Share 5.7E-6 1.6E-5 -2.0E-5 -0.002
(0.937) (0.801) (0.871) (0.945)
Tax rate 0.035 -0.004 -0.063 -12.098
(0.251) (0.882) (0.216) (0.266)
Adjusted RA2 0.008 0.056 0.007 0.006
F Statistics 
N= 1178
2.492 12.684 1.064 2.247
Notes:
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Top number is the coefficient, number below in brackets is the p-value
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Panel C -  Japan
Variable Healy DeAngelo Jones
Modified
Jones
Intercept 3.1E-06 -0.022 -0.114 -0.084
(0.008) ** (2.4E-5) ** (2E-78) ** (IE-64) **
Debt to Equity Ratio 2.7E-7 0.001 0.003 0.004
(7.5E-2) ** (7E-2) ** (1.2E-5) ** (4E-10) **
Firm Size -8E-13 -1.2E-8 7.8E-8 2.4E-8
(0.792) (0.413) (8.9E-6) ** (0.091)
Firm Performance -9.4E-5 0.010 -0.923 -0.415
' (2.2E-7) ** (0.900) (IE-22) ** (6.5E-8) **
Business Cycle -3.4E-6 -0.024 -0.022 -0.017
(0.004) ** (0.001) ** (0.001) ** (0.001) **
Earnings Per Share 6.2E-9 -1.7E-5 -6.5E-6 -9.5E-5
(0.411) (0.609) (0.867) (0.003) * *
Tax rate 2.3E-8 1.1E-4 9.3E-5 1.7E-4
(0.666) (0.648) (0.735) (0.463)
Adjusted R*2 0.006 0.004 0.027 0.017
F Statistics 6.063 4.362 23.824 14.800
N = 4878
Notes:
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Top number is the coefficient, number below in brackets is the p-value
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4.4.1.2 Regression results from the two European countries
Healy and Jones’s model suggests there is a positive relationship between firm 
performance and earnings management in the UK using the DeAngelo model, and the 
Jones model suggests the same relationship in France. Moreover, the regression result 
indicates there are more discretionary accruals during the contraction period in France. 
The results suggest we should accept hypotheses 3 and 4.
The F-statistic value indicates the Jones model provides the most statistical power 
to explain the determinants of earnings management in the two European countries. 
While Dechow et al. (1995) concluded that the Modified Jones model provides the most 
powerful test of earnings management, we add to the current literature in concluding that 
the Jones model is the best model to use to explain earnings management in European 
countries.
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Panel D - United Kingdom
Variable Healy DeAngelo Jones
Modified
Jones
(0.487) (0.752) (3.7E-7) ** ( I 2F-7) **
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.001 -4.1E-4 0.002 -0.002
(0.976) (0.935) (0.657) (0.572)
Firm Size 2.0E-6 -1.4E-7 -8.1E-7 5.3E-7
(0.899) (0.952) (0.625) (0.758)
Firm Performance 4.333 0.284 0.746 0.251
(0.001) ** (0.144) (4.5E-8) ** (0.073)
Business Cycle -0.092 -0.020 -0.042 - 0.001
(0.634) (0.497) (0.046) (0.947)
Earnings Per Share -1.9E-4 -3.4E-6 -7.0E-5 2.8E-5
(0.866) (0.984) (0.563) (0.824)
Tax rate 9.74E-5 5.22E-5 2.00E-4 -3.9H-5
(0.988) (0.958) (0.771) (0.956)
Adjusted RA2 0.001 -0.001 0.005 -4H-4
F Statistics 2.052 0.442 5.891 0.602
N = 5998 •
Notes:
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Top number is the coefficient, number below in brackets is the p-value
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Panel E -  France
Variable Healy DeAngelo Jones
Modified
Jones
(0.105) (0.699) (4E-6) ** (0.031) *
Debt to Equity Ratio -4.4E-4 9.5E-09 -0.006 0.001
(0.878) (0.973) (0.048) * (0.737)
Firm Size 6E-10 IE-12 -1.6E-8 -6.7E-8
(0.973) (0.367) (0.405) (3.9E-5) **
Firm Performance -0.079 0.000 0.419 0.109
(0.671) (0.004) ** (0.029) * (0.490)
Business Cycle -0.032 -3.4E-6 -0.025 -0.003
(0.014) * (0.009) ** (0.070) ** (0.803)
Earnings Per Share -5.0E-4 -5.9E-8 -3.4E-3 -4.4E-4
(0.510) (0.438) (1.4E-5) ** (0.496)
Tax rate 0.026 4.3E-7 0.027 0.001
(0.321) (0.868) (0.312) (0.960)
Adjusted RA2 0.001 0.014 0.022 0.016
F Statistics 1.221 3.307 4.795 3.670
N = 998
Notes:
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Top number is the coefficient, number below in brackets is the p-value
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4.4.1.3 Regression Results from the Two North American Countries
Table 4.4 panels F and G suggest a negative relationship between firm size, firm 
performance and earnings management. Panel F also indicates that the discretionary 
accruals are higher during the contraction period. These results are consistent with our 
findings in the Asian and European countries.
Although we did not find significant results from the tax rate variable in the Asian 
and European countries, the relationship between the tax rate variable and earnings 
management is highly significant in Canada and the US. Our findings are consistent with 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004), who found evidence that reported taxes are used to determine 
earnings management in United States and Canada. The resulting difference in tax 
variables might be due to the cultural difference among the countries. The North 
American countries have the highest Individualism and lowest Power Distance. These 
two cultural factors have likely contributed to differences among these countries.
F statistic results from Canada and the United States clearly indicate that the 
Jones and Modified Jones models provide more powerful tests of earnings managements. 
Our result is consistent with Dechow’s (1995) findings.
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Panel F - Canada
Variable Healy DeAngelo Jones
Modified
Jones
(1.2E-6) ** (2.0E-10) ** (2.6E-4) ** (4.0E-5) **
Debt to Equity Ratio 1.1E-5 -7.6E-5 0.001 0.001
(0.555) (0.946) (0.554) (0.473)
Firm Size -5.0E-10 -1.3E-8 -1.6E-7 -1.7E-7
(0.420) (0.721) (1.1E-05) ** (5.7E-06) **
Firm Performance -0.012 -0.498 -0.179 -0.268
(1.0E-32) ** (1.3E-16) ** (0.002) ** (5.0E-6) **
Business Cycle -2.8E-4 0.022 -0.013 -0.014
(0.018) ** (0.002) ** (0.072) * (0.046) *
Earnings Per Share -2.2E-8 1.0E-5 -1.2E-5 -1.3E-5
(0.975) (0.806) (0.775) (0.758)
Tax rate 1.7E-4 0.006 0.014 0.012
(4.6E-7) ** (0.003) ** (2.7E-11) ** (1.5E-9)
Adjusted R*2 0.035 0.046 0.034 0.083
F Statistics 12.420 11.018 16.951 29.493
N = 1879
Notes:
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Top number is the coefficient, number below in brackets is the p-vahte
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Panel G - United States
Variable Healy DeAngelo Jones
Modified
Jones
(0.441) (0.002) ** (3E-12) ** (3E-15) ***
Debt to Equity Ratio -2.2E-5 -1.4E-3 0.001 0.001
(0.687) (0.042) * (0.091) (0.065)
Firm Size 6E-10 -1.9E-8 -7.5E-8 -8.4E-8
(0.815) (0.593) (0.015) * (0.012) *
Firm Performance -0.019 -0.004 -0.280 -0.267
(4.4E-5) ** (0.943) (6.4E-8) ** (2.1E-6) **
Business Cycle -5.3E-04 -0.010 -0.001 0.001
(0.472) (0.281) (0.874) (0.903)
Earnings Per Share -3.4E-8 1.0E-5 6.2E-6 5.6E-6
(0.979) (0.530) (0.660) (0.712)
Tax rate -1.8E-4 -0.010 0.019 0.022
(0.757) (0.142) (2.1E-3) ** (1.3E-3) **
Adjusted R*2 0.002 3.8E-4 0.008 0.007
F Statistics 2.897 1.377 8.781 7.898
N = 5998___________________________________________________
Notes:
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Top number is the coefficient, number below in brackets is the p-value
In summary, the results from Table 4.4 suggest there is a difference on 
determinants of earnings management amongst different countries. Overall, we found that 
the Jones and Modified Jones models provide the most statistical power to explain the 
determinants of earnings management. One explanation of this difference between 
countries might be due to the difference in accounting principles. For example, US and 
Canadian firms use Generally Accepted Accounting Principle to report their financial 
statements. The European firms use International Financial Reporting Standards. Besides
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the variations in accounting standards, cultural and institutional factors play an important 
role in explaining earnings managements. In the following section, we will use multiple 
regression methods to examine if a country’s cultural and institutional variables 
contribute to the international difference in earnings management.
4.4.2 Regression Analysis amongst Seven Countries
The Cluster Analysis suggests a systematic relationship exists between cultural 
variables and earnings management across a sample of seven countries. In addition, the 
regression results from individual countries suggest many of the financial variables are 
determinants of earnings management. Finally, an OLS multiple regression analysis was 
conducted to further examine the relationship between financial, cultural, and 
institutional variables and earnings management. Table 4.S reports the regression 
results from equation 3.1 to 3.4 (Model 1 to 4) for the period 1992-2011. The relatively 
low adjusted R2 suggests that the percentage of variation in the dependent variables is not 
explained well by the independent variables. However, the F statistic results suggest most 
of the models developed in this study are highly significant.
4.4.2.1 Regression Results with DA (Jones) as a Dependent Variable
Table 4.5 Panel A uses discretionary accruals from the Jones Model as a 
dependent variable. The results from all models are consistent. As expected, among the 
financial variables, there is a positive correlation between the D/E ratio and earnings 
management (hypothesis 1). Also, there is a positive relationship between firm 
performance and discretionary accruals (hypothesis 4). Furthermore, business cycle and 
discretionary accruals are negatively correlated (hypothesis 3). The smaller-sized firms
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require high leverage to finance the operations and investments during contraction 
periods because the cost of additional equity financing might be too high and investors 
are not looking to invest in the small companies during recession periods. Therefore, 
managers are motivated to report higher earnings and show they have sufficient cash flow 
to banks, and to demonstrate that they are able to repay the loan in the near future in 
order to obtain additional debt financing.
The cultural and institutional variables are significant in these models. As 
expected, there is a positive relationship between Uncertain Avoidance (hypothesis 6), 
Individualism (hypothesis 7), Power Distance (hypothesis 8) and earnings management. 
These results indicate that cultural factors are significant in explaining a portion of the 
variation in earnings management even after controlling for the mitigating effect of 
institutional factors. The above findings are consistent with the findings of Leuz et al. 
(2003) and Timothy (2008). The F-statistics suggest that all the models (Model 1 to 4) 
are significant.
4.4.2.2 Regression results with DA (Modified Jones) as a dependent variable
Table 4.5 Panel B reports the results of the regression analysis when discretionary 
accruals from the Modified Jones model were used. Consistent with our finding in section 
4.4.2.1, Firm Performance (FP) is a significant determinant of earnings management. 
However, most of the cultural and institutional variables were not found to be significant. 
Moreover, F statistics suggest the equation 3.1 to 3.4 (Model 1 to Model 4) were not 
significant when measuring discretionary accruals from the Modified Jones model as a 
dependent variable. This finding is opposite to Dechow’s (1995) result which suggested
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that the Modified Jones model provides the most powerful test of earnings management. 
One explanation is that the accounting standard difference contributes to the low power of 
the Modified Jones model. At least two sets of accounting standards were used in our 
samples, and the Modified Jones model was unable to detect earnings manipulation on 
revenue through misstatement of accounts receivable in Asian and European countries.
4A.2.3 Regression results with DA (Healy) and DA (DeAngelo)
Table 4.5 panel C uses discretionary accruals from the Healy Model as a 
dependent variable. The relationship between firm performance and earnings 
management is positive (hypothesis 4). No other variables are significant. Tabic 4.5 panel 
D uses the DeAngelo model of discretionary accruals as a dependent variable. All 
hypotheses are rejected from this table. F-statistics suggest that equations developed in 
this study are not significant when the Healy and DeAngelo accrual models served as 
dependent variables. This result is consistent with many prior studies.
In summary, the Jones model provides the most statistically significant results when 
financial, cultural and institutional variables are used to explain earnings management on 
the international level.
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Table 4.5
REGRESSION RESULTS ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MODELS
Panel A: Regression results with DA (Jones) as dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.009 -0.128 -0.131 -1.255
(0.102) (0.001) ** (0.001) ** (0.002) **
Debt to Equity Ratio (D/E) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.041) * (0.409) (0.441)
Firm Size (FS) -3E-9 -2.883 -3E-9
(0.001) ** (0.887) (0.899)
Firm Performance (FP) 0.395 0.305 0.313
(0.001) ** (9E-11) ** (4E-11) **
Business Cycle (BC) -0.013 -0.011 -0.012
(0.006) ** (0.050) ** (0.049) *
Earnings Per Share (EPS) -4E-06 -7E-06 -7E-06
(0.826) (0.729) (0.705)
Tax rate (TR) IE-04 2E-04 2E-04
(0.662) (0.487) (0.488)
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.001) ** (5E-65) ** (2E-08) **
Individualism (IND) 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.001) ** (IE-32) ** (3E-10) **
Power Distance (PD) 0.001 0.001 0.006
(0.001) ** (8E-05) ** (3E-04) **
Outside Investor Rights (OIR) 0.132
(0.004) *
Legal Enforcement (ENF) 0.002
(0.013) *
Securities Regulations (REG) (0.691)
(0.001) *
Legal System (LEG) 0.315
(0.002) **
Adjusted RA2 0.004 0.046 0.047 0.048
F Statistics 15.299 374.436 130.440 98.707
* *  Coefficient is significant a t the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant a t the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
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Table 4.5 (continued)
Panel B: Regression results with DA (Modified Jones) as dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -0.149 2.166 1.949 -12.398
(0.342) (0.022) ** (0.042) (0.254)
Debt to Equity Ratio (D/E) -0.002 0.001 5E-04
(0.933) (0.965) (0.980)
Firm Size (FS) -2.3E-8 1.4E-8 -3.5E-7
(0.969) (0.981) (0.610)
Firm Performance (FP) 3.457 3.556 3.120
(4.2E-5) ** (3.3E-5) ** (3.4E-5)
Business Cycle (BC) 0.124 0.125 0.117
(0.457) (0.452) (0.481)
Earnings Per Share (EPS) -3.3E-5 -2.5E-5 -3.2E-5
(0.947) (0.975) (0.952)
Tax rate (TR) -3.2E-4 -2.8E-4 -1.5E-4
(0.972) (0.979) (0.991)
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) -0.009 -0.009 -0.034
(0.012) * (0.014) * (0.178)
Individualism (IND) -0.016 -0.016 0.009
(0.015) * (0.015) * (0.697)
Power Distance (PD) -0.011 -0.010 0.065
(0.220) (0.261) (0.137)
Outside Investor Rights (OIR) 0.920
(0.461)
Legal Enforcement (ENF) 0.617
(0.010)
Securities Regulations (REG) -4.533
(0.450)
Legal System (LEG) 2.068
(0.450)
N 23,473 23,473 23,473 23,473
Adjusted RA2 0.001 0.03 0.04 0.08
F Statistics 1.270 3.043 1.901 2.508
* *  Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 4.5 (continued)
Panel C: Regression results with DA (Healy) as dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -0.047 -0.175 -0.216 -1.586
(0.298) (0.535) (0.448) (0.625)
Debt to Equity Ratio (D/E) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.872) (0.918) (0.922)
Firm Size (FS) 4.2E-8 2.4E-8 2.3E-8
(0.788) (0.913) (0.883)
Firm Performance (FP) 1.579 1.620 1.614
(4.8E-5) ** (3.2E-5) ** (5.3E-0) **
Business Cycle (BC) -0.019 -0.020 -0.020
(0.697) (0.693) (0.694)
Earnings Per Share (EPS) -1.4E-5 -1.5E-5 -2.3E-5
(0.925) (0.931) (0.908)
Tax rate (TR) 8.4E-6 7.7E-6 3.4E-5
(0.998) (0.998) (0.992)
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.530) (0.506) (0.717)
Individualism (IND) 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.806) (0.832) (0.761)
Power Distance (PD) 0.002 0.002 0.007
(0.527) (0.440) (0.602)
Outside Investor Rights (OIR) 0.140
(0.706)
Legal Enforcement (ENF) 0.028
(0.691)
Securities Regulations
(REG) -0.090
(0.960)
Legal System (LEG) 0.041
(0.960)
N 23,473 23,473 23,473 23,473
Adjusted RA2 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.04
F Statistics 2.888 0.430 2.151 1.720
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 4.5 (continued)
Panel P : Regression results with PA (DeAngelo) as dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -0.013 -0.109 -0.101 0.339
(0.130) (0.047) * (0.067) * (0.588)
Debt to Equity Ratio (D/E) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.150) (0.286) (0.286)
Firm Size (FS) -2.8E-8 -1.4E-8 -7.3E-9
(0.579) (0.664) (0.841)
Firm Performance (FP) 0.011 0.015 0.038
(0.878) (0.844) (0.611)
Business Cycle (BC) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.300) (0.305) (0.319)
Earnings Per Share (EPS) 5E-6 6E-06 8E-06
(0.867) (0.853) (0.792)
Tax rate (TR) 3E-05 6E-05 4E-05
(0.950) (0.915) (0.937)
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) -4E-04 -4E-04 0.002
(0.047) * .. (0.066) (0.097)
Individualism (IND) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.102) (0.107) (0.695)
Power Distance (PD) 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.009) ** (0.009) ** (0.799)
Outside Investor Rights (OIR) -0.015
(0.835)
Legal Enforcement (ENF) -0.021
(0.122)
Securities Regulations (REG) -0.254
(0.463)
Legal System (LEG) 0.116
(0.463)
N 23,472 23,473 23,473 23,473
Adjusted RA2 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.09
F Statistics 0.580 4.693 1.835 2.711
* *  Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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CHAPTER FIVE
C o n c l u s io n
This study documents systematic differences in earnings management across 
seven countries in the time period from 1992 -  2011. We performed a descriptive cluster 
analysis to identify groupings of countries with similar cultural dimensions and then 
showed how earnings management varies systematically across these countries. We also 
found significant results from our regression analyses which indicate that traditional 
financial, cultural and institutional variables are key determinants to explain earnings 
management.
In contrast to most of the existing research, we included four discretionary accrual 
models to examine which model has the greatest statistical power to explain earnings 
managements on the international level. Our results suggest that although the Modified 
Jones model provides the most significant results for US and Canadian firms, the Jones 
model provides better explanatory power on earnings management in the international 
context.
While most prior studies were done on North American firms and meaningful 
results were found, the accounting theory developed in Northern America may not be 
appropriate for explaining earnings management in other countries. We did not obtain 
many significant results in Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, or India in our single 
country regression analysis. One explanation is that the accounting standard differences 
caused insignificant results. Another explanation is cultural difference. India and Hong 
Kong were colonies of the United Kingdom for a very long period of time. Although they
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are located in different parts of the world, the United Kingdom had a significant cultural 
impact on both India and Hong Kong. The above findings suggest that there is significant 
variation amongst the countries due to different cultural dimensions. The results indicate 
that cultural dimensions cannot be ignored in future earnings management studies.
This paper adds to the literature by suggesting that culture is a potentially important 
factor to explain international difference in earnings management. Although most of the 
countries with large securities markets were included in this sample, an obvious 
extension of this (Hofstede G. , National Culture in Four Dimensions, 1983) paper is to 
expand the number of countries in order to test if the hypotheses developed here will hold 
true in a larger sample of countries. Future research could investigate the cultural effects 
of earnings management by comparing the differences that exist on the seven continents.
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